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What does 'globaíisation' really mean? Ifwe were to evalúate ¡he concept of
globalisafion in terms of the frequeucy oflts use iré would conchide that it
refers to a concrete and unqiiestionable reality. tfowever, thls conclusión is
farfrom adequate. Indeed, globaíisation is a very controversia! concept that
has originaíed diverse political and academic debates. Reíd et ai (1999,) for
exampie, in establishing a now classic trilátera! typology, have distinguished
behveen aiithors it'/ío assuine an optimistic, scepñcal or critical visión in
order to understand and explain thepotentia! impací of globaíisation on the
Nation-State', as iré// as other dimensions. Startingfrom rhis t\polog)> as a
framework for analysis, litis paper re-examines the specific debate on the
impact of globalisation upon one ofthe more traditionally exclusive spheres
ofthe Nation-State: fiscalpoiicies. !t concludes that ifreguiated according to
'econoinic invariable ¡aws', farfrom being an inevitably constrainingphe-
nomenon, globaíisation is better understood ifit is observed as an econoinic
poíiticalprocess (¡üstoñcaily determined), as insistently emphasized by
sic political economy.
I. THE GLOBALISATION DEBATE wide interconnectedness of many aspects
of contemporary social Ufe. This process
i n general terms, commentators wouldincludeeconomic, cultural, political
¡ agree that globaíisation refers to andspiritualdimensions [Heldeí«/(1999):
an increasing process of world- 2]. However,beyondthis general acknow-
Heldeío/. (1999),p.2.
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ledgement, there is substantial disagree-
ment conceming the conceptua-lisation,
causal dynamics, socio-economic conse-
quences, implications for statepower and
governance, and historical trajectory of
globalisation.
One of the first comprehensive
characterísations of such a debate was of-
fered by Held et al, (1999) who propose a
typology that distinguish among three main
theoretical streams: 'hyperglobalisers',
'sceptics' and 'transformationalists'2.
Economic globalisation has originated
new forms of social organisation.
'Hyperglobalisers' include authors
who characterize 'globalisation' as quite
a novel phenomenon that would define a
new era of human history in which the
logic and discipline of the global market
would not only be predominant but would
also replace the historical role of the na-
tion-state. Furthermore, in this sense,
globalisation -as asserted by a popular
commentator- would mean that «traditional
nation-states have become unnatural, even
impossible business units in a global
economy» [Ohmae (1995): 5]. According
to most hyperglobalisers, the main cause
of globalisation is the emergence of the
global economy through the establishment
of a sort of transnational network of pro-
duction, trade and finance [Held et al
(1999): 3], Furthermore, for those schol-
ars, economic globalisation has originated
new forms of social organisation that tend
to replace the societal, economic and po-
litical role of the nation-state. The result
is a view that assumes that the role of
state is reduced to little more than a «trans-
míssion belt for global capital» or a «simple
intermedíate institution sandwiched be-
t\veen increasingly powerful local, regional
and global mechanisms of governance»
[Held et al (1999): 3]. However, although
most of 'hyperglobalisers3 share the
premise that the market has imposed its
rule over the state3, they can be classified
into neo-liberals -those who assume the
emergence of a single global market as
an advanced stage of human progress
[Ohmae (1995)], and neo-Marxists -those
who highlight economic globalisation as an
imposition of an oppressive global capital-
ista, which in many respects might have
given rise to a more uneven and savage
international order [Greider, (1997)].
It is worthwhile noting, however, that
both approaches agree that globalisation
is producing a new división of labour, ex-
plained by an increasing process of
transnationalisation of production, that may
have replaced the traditional North-South
división. However, while the neo-liberal
perspective assumes that global economic
competition does not necessarily produce
Other useful compilations on the globalisation debate are Scholíe (2005) andHolton (2005). In turn,
for the best critique on the theoretical confusions surrounding such debate, see Rosenberg (2000).
«...the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the post war period more by prívate
enterpríse in finance, industry, and trade than by cooperativo decisions of governments, are now
more powerful than the states to whorn ultímate political authority over society and economy is
supposed to belong» (Strange, 1996, p. 4).
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zero-sum outcomes (because countries
are able to specialise in accordance with
their comparative advantages, and scale
economies, generating enough wealth that
would allow winners to compénsate los-
ers and still remainbetter off), neo-Marx-
ists stress that globalisation has not only
failed to resolve global inequalities, but has
also created and reinforced structural pat-
terns of inequality between and within
countries.
The most predominant feature of the
current international economy is the
process of economic regionalism.
'Sceptics', inturn, comprise scholars
who definitely refute the idea that
globalisation has given rise to a process
of integrated worldwide economy in which
states would be increasingly redundant.
Instead, sceptical commentators point out
that globalisation is, at best, a process of
internationalisation, which according to
thern means no more than a process of
interactions which take place predomi-
nantly between nation-states [Hirst and
Thompson (1999): Ch. 4]. Indeed, for
sceptics, globalisation is fundamentally a
myth in two main senses. First of all, cur-
rent levéis of global economic integration
would not really be historically unprec-
edented. On the contrary, they would be
less intense than world flows of trade, in-
vestment and labour in the nineteenth cen~
tury. Second, contemporary globalisation,
far from creating a completely integrated
global market, would be focused solely on
the 'triad' formed by the three main eco-
nomic blocs of the European Union,
NAFTA and APEC [Ruigrok and Tulder
(1995): 148-51; BoyerandDrache(1996);
Hirts and Thompson (1999): Ch. 4]. This
process of economic regionalism, which
is purportedly contradictory to the
globalisation process, is really the most
predominant feature of the current inter-
national economy [Weiss (1998)].
Moreover, hyperglobalisers's insis-
tence in defining globalisation as a pro-
cess that brings about a new, less state-
centric order [Held et al (1999): 5] is
strongly rejected by the sceptic's thesis,
that not only denies that the nation-state
is in retreat, but also considers that states
are the real promoters of internatio-
nalisation. It is alleged that this is particu-
larly true in the case of the United States,
a superpower that after the Second World
War began supporting a multilateral eco-
nomic order, abandoning its formerly tra-
ditional unilateralism This is considered to
be the real cause of the beginning of an
increasing process of liberalisation of na-
tional economies worldwide, and not the
other way around [Gilpin (1987)]. Natu-
ralíy, sceptics admit that internationa-
lisation might constrain the range of ac-
tion of governments, but for them, such
constraints do not immobilize governments
at all. In fací, in many cases internationa-
lisation of capital might «not merely re-
strict policy choices but expand them as
well» [Weiss (1998): 184].
For sceptics, a far more important fací
are the consequences that a process of
economic internationalisation would pro-
duce in an international order, such as a
huge increase in the economic margina-
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lisation of many developing countries as a
direct result of extreme concentration of
trade and investment flows within devel-
oped countries. Furthermore, some scep-
tical commentators also refute the thesis
of the emergence of a new interaational
división of labour, linked to theNorth's de-
industrialisation and the extensión of new
webs of production in the South. Indeed,
these authors emphasize that the belief that
the world economy is dominated by glo-
bal corporations without regard for any
traditional jurisdiction is another «myth».
In fací, the patterns of foreign investment
flows show clearly that they are mostly
concentrated in developed countries and
that most multinational corporations are,
in fact, strongly linked to their home state
orregions. Therefore, farfrom consider-
ing that a new global economic order has
emerged as a consequence of internation-
alization, sceptics assert that in structuraí
terms, the deeply rooted patterns of in-
equality and hierarchy of the world
economy have only experienced marginal
modifícations overthe last century [Held
et al (1999): 6]. Despite hyperglobalisers
belief, sceptics argüe that increasing pat-
terns of inequality in the contemporary
world economy are failing to genérate a
global civilization. On the contrary, they
have contributed to the rise of both fun-
damentalism and extreme nationalism,
which, in turn, have led to a world frag-
mented in cultural and ethnic enclaves.
Finally, 'transformationalists' are a
group of scholars who agree with
hyperglobalisers in assuming that
globalisation is a historically unprecedeníed
process experienced by societies and gov-
ernments around the world, characterísed
by a weakening of the distinction between
international and domestic affairs [Rose-
nau (1990); Cammilleri and Falk (1992);
Ruggie (1993); Linkiater and MacMillan
(1995); Sassen (1996)].
The patterns of inequality and
hierarchy of the world economy
have changed marginally over
the last century.
Furthermore, they view globalisation
as a central driving forcé that is modify-
ing the social, political and economic as-
pects of modern societies and the world
order [Giddens (1990); Scholte (1993)
(2005); Castells (1996)]. Indeed, Giddens
(1996) for instance, characterises the
changes generated by globalisation as a
'massive shake-out' of societies, econo-
mies, institutions of governance and the
whole world order. However, while
hyperglobalists assume that the final prod-
uct of globalisation will be the emergence
of a single global market and the disap-
pearance of the nation-state, 'transforma-
tionalists' argüe that the direction of
globalisation is both uncertain andunpre-
dictable, preventing a reliable forecasting
[Held etal (1999): 7]. Indeed, globalisation
is characterísed as a contingent and open-
ended historical process that has count-
less variables, most of which would have
contradictor/ effects.
It is also worthwhile noting that
'transformationalists' do not consider that
the emergence of a single global system
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is equivalent to a balanced and equal world
society. By contrast, they associate
globalisation with the emergence of new
patterns of global stratifícation, which, in
turn, determine different levéis of social,
community and national integration of the
global order. The rise of a new form of
global power relations, which is a central
point of the transformationaíist thesis,
might have replaced traditional characteri-
sations such as the North-South división
or the First and Third worlds that, accord-
ing to transformationalists, would have
become obsolete. In fact, these oíd charac-
terisations of the international scenario
oñen overlook the way in which globali-
sation has modified patterns of inclusión
and exclusión between countries. These
might now be better described as net-
works that cut across and penétrate all
societies and regions of the world
[Hoogvelt (2001): xü-xiv].
A new form of global power relations
might have replaced characterizations
such as the North-South división.
ForCastells (1996) andRuggie (1996)
the main cause of this new stratified glo-
bal order is the de-terrítorialisation ofeco-
nomical activities, that is a direct conse-
quence of an increasing process of
transnationalisation of production and fi-
nance, and as a result of which the na-
tional economic space no longer coincides
with national territorial borders [Castells
(1996): Ch. 2:77-147].
Compared to sceptical and hyper-
globalist approaches, 'transformationalists'
assume neither the obsolescence ñor the
unchanging condition of the nation-state,
but a new phenomenon called the juxta-
positionofauthorities [Helde/L<:¿/(1999):
8]. Indeed, although 'transforma-tionalists'
still argüe that states retain the ultímate
legal claim to exercise effective supremacy
over what occurs within their own territo-
ries, they also emphatically argüe that
states are being affected by the expand-
ing jurisdiction of international institutions
and the constraints imposed by interna-
tional law [Goodman (1997)]. Inthis sense,
the traditional conception of sovereignty
as an undisputed authority within a given
territory would be outdated as a descrip-
tive statement, and would have been re-
píaced by the notion of a juxtaposed state,
that is, a state wherein different kinds of
transnationaljurisdictions overlap [Heldeí
al (1999): 8]. In other words, the state
would not disappear but the relationship
between sovereignty and territoriality
might be dramatically transformed.
2. GLOBALISATION AND THE
NATION-STATE
As we have seen, one of the most
controversial issues within globalisation lit-
erature relates to the state. States have
been the most important actors in the po-
litical organisation of societies and have
played a key role in the external relations
between nations during the modera era.
For this reason, the way in which
globalisation affects them, either by pro-
ducing the obsolescence of their functions,
the reconfiguration of their power, or even
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the continuiíy of theirtraditional sovereign
status, has been object of a huge discrep-
ancy among scholars in the globalisation
debate.
A real global system of independent
states started to emerge as a
direct consequence of the
decolonization process.
Modera states emerged in Western
Europe and its colonial territories in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but
their real origins date back to the late six-
teenth century4. The characteristic that
distinguíshed the first states from earlier
forms of political organisation was the
symmetry and correspondence existing
between sovereignty, territory and legiti-
macy. Indeed, the development of the con-
cept of sovereignty as a special claim to
the rightful and exclusive exercise of po-
litical power over a given territory was a
key factor in the emergence of the state
[Held et al (1999): 9]. As it is known in
the modern era, the natíon-state has de-
veloped a unified system of rule, a central
administration, a concentrated mechanism
of fiscal policies, a system of lawmaking
and law enforcement, a professional army,
as well as a diplomatic corps in charge of
its foreisn relations. The consolidation of
the nation-state fírstly took place in Eu-
rope, but it was not until the aftermath of
the Second War World that a real global
system of independent states started to
emerge as a direct consequence of the
decolonisation process. Furthermore, the
final consolidation of this global system of
states only happened during the late twen-
tieth century, when the great empires -
European and Soviet-finallycollapsed,
Therefore, from a long-term histori-
cal perspective it seems undisputable that
the modera nation-state appeared at the
end of the twentíeth century as the pre-
dominant type of political organisation of
nations worldwide. Inthis sense, sceptics
claim that the twentieth century is the age
of the modera nation-state and, conse-
quently, radically reject the possibility that
the state is in retreat, would appear to be
backed by solid evidence. Indeed, it seems
undisputed that modera nation-states have
concentrated the legitímate exercise of the
use of forcé andjudicial regulation, estab-
lished permanent military forces, imple-
mented central fiscal policies, and imposed
an official language and a national iden-
tity. Even some hyperglobalists recognise
this point5.
Furthermore, many states, especially
inthe Organisation forEconomic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD), have
traditionally ímplemented macroeconomic
In fact, theír origins are often referred to as the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which concluded
the Thirty Years' War. See Falk (1969) and Kehoane (1995).
«The intrusión of governments into our daily lives in the 1990s, as compared, say, with the 1890s, is
palpably greater. Statutory or administrad ve law now rules on the hours of work, the conditions of safety
in the work place and in the home, on the behaviour of citizens on the road. School and uníversities are
subject to more and more decisions taken in ministries of education. Planning offícials have to be consulted
before the smallest building is started or a tree is cut down», in Strange (1996), p. xi.
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strategies, shiñing from Keynesian de-
mand management in the 1950s and 1970s
to extensive supply-side measures in the
1980s and 1990s, in order to promote eco-
nomic growth and widespread employ-
ment [Held and McGrew (2000): 10]. In
spite of the fact that most of these strate-
gies have often been unsuccessful, they
seem to demónstrate the central role
played by the state in controlling the na-
tional and International economy.
Whether or not international
finan cial and commercial
constraints preclude governments
from setting up national economic
strategies contínues to be debated.
Furthermore, it is worthwhile noting
that 'sceptics' have always recognized that
the role of the state has historically been
constrained by the prevailing structure of
the world order, that is, the modern na-
tion-state system and capitalist economic
relations. However, they dispute the
'hyperglobalistV assumption that the key
characteristics of globalisation are the in-
creasing restrictions imposed by the dy-
naraic of the international economy over
a set of policy options confronted by gov-
ernments. It has been argued that a good
example against this type of general con-
straints imposed by globalisation might be
the common shape of policies implemented
by OECD countries as well as by states
in sub-Sabaran África, east Asia and Latín
America in the late twentieth century such
as market liberalisation, welfare cut-backs,
minimal regulations of prívate capital flows
and processes of deregulation of labour
markets, wbich far frombeing attributed
by sceptics to just one inescapable single
global driving forcé, result from a diverse
set of political factors [Held and McGrew,
(2000): 10]. This point, however, is far
from uncontested. Moreover, to what ex-
tent the implementation of these policies
has been a consequence of either the con-
straints produced by globalisation or a re-
sult of an autonomous decisión of the gov-
ernment or any combination of both, is a
central unresolved matter in the literature
concerning globalisation and the nation-
state6. In fact, while international fman-
cial mobility, especially capital mobility,
might impose similar economic restrictions
on all national economies around the
world, governments respond to this con-
straint in different ways. The various re-
sponses would be explained, amongst
other factors, by variations in the type of
capitalism predominant in the national
economy of a given state, by the type of
political system of the countries and by
the level of social integration of national
societies. The current stage of the discus-
sion, however, continúes to be whether or
not international fínancial and commercial
constraints preclude governments' ability
to set up national economic strategies. In
other words, is it true that as a consequence
of international capital mobility, govern-
For a critical review of this debate see Saad-Filho and Johnston (2005). See also Palan and Abbot
(1999), Desai (2001) and Bruff (2004).
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ments for instance, have been forcea to
adopt similarneoliberal economics policies,
which, in turn, have consequently stimu-
lated fínancial discipline and reduced the
margin of governments' actions? More-
over, has the global competition in which
states are involvedto attract international
capital to national economies, increasingly
reduced governments' ability to maintain
high levéis of social protection or welfare
state programmes? In short, are we in the
presence of the definite end of the wel-
fare state as (we have known' it, as former
President of the United States, Bill Clinton
has declared? It is uponthis debate about
the ability of the state to pursue national
economic strategies and to maintain a
welfare state systern free of the con-
straints imposed by the global economy
that this paper will be focused, and spe-
cifically on the impact of globalisation on
the fiscal policies of the nation-states.
3. GLOBALTSATION AND FISCAL POLICIES
The main discussion of the literature on
globalisation and fiscal policies focuses on
the claim that a process of capital-market
integrationwould produce aphenomenonof
'fiscal squeeze' [Grunberg (1998): 591]. A
fiscal squeezewouldhavetwo componente:
fírstly, the increasing difficulty of govern-
ments to collect revenue from the prívate
sector, and secondly, a rise in demand for
public spending. These elements constitute
the hypothesis of «double jeopardising» of
public finance [Grunberg (1998): 597].
Market dislocations and income
inequalities might stimulate the
demand for social insurance from
more vulnerable social groups.
Grunberg identifies three áreas of eco-
nomic globalisation-trade, investment and
financia! liberalisation-aíí of which have
direct and indirect effects on public bud-
gets7. The effects of economic globali-
sation8 are summarised as the increasing
Firstly, trade liberalisation leads directfy to a loss of revenue from tariffs, the reduction or elimination
of which is the main target of a trade liberalisation policy. The indirect effect of trade liberalisation on
the public budget is the demand and need for additional public resources to either subsidise fírms or
to provide social adjustment, Secondly, fínancial liberalisation brings as a direct effect the loss of
revenue from 'fínancial repressíon'. Indirect effects include the loss of seignorage revenue as a
consequence of the lower inflation brought by fínancial liberalisation, the revenue íost by governments
from a disappearing so-called «inflation tax» (that is, the ability to repay investors in devalued
currency), and the increase of governmental spending motivated by ñnancial crises, which in the last
few years have become recurrent in developing countríes. Finally, investment liberalisation produces
as a direct effect the challenge to tax collectíon. The best illustration of this concern is foreign direct
investment taxation. The indirect effect of investment liberaüsation is tax competition. Since capital
tends to prefer low-tax environments, states are engaging in a competition to lower corporate and
capital gains taxes, resulting in overall shortfalls in tax receipts, Grunberg (1998), pp. 594-595.
Economic globalisation includes trade, investment and fínancial liberalisation.
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difficulties in raising reverme, added to the
growing demand for public spending
[Grunberg (1998): 601]. In turn, ithas been
argued that the main political consequence
of economic globalisation is the breaking
of the social deal that tacitly operated be-
tween govemments and the working class
duríng the post-Second War World period,
on the basis of which govemments com-
mitted themselves to establishing social
insurance in exchange for foreign trade
liberalisation [Rodrik (1997a): 2]. In this
sense, Rodrik (1997a) warns us about so-
cial disintegration and the loss of domes-
tic consensus in favour of open markets
that might result from an unbalanced pro-
cess of economic integration.
The 'doublejeopardy» on fiscal poli-
cies produced by globalisation has also
been analysed on the basis of the so-called
efficiency and compensation effects9. The
formerrefers to the impact of globalisation
on the suppiy side of the political market.
In other words, it focuses on the
government's ability to fínance public
goods in a globalised era by íncreasing
taxes. The latter, in turn, assesses the in-
fluence exerted by globalisation on the
demand side of the political market. In this
sense, the demand for public spending,
especially for income transfers, is alleg-
edly positively correlated to a hígher de-
gree of economic globalisation. This is
because market dislocations and the coun-
teractionof income inequalities generated
by globalisation might stimulate the de-
mand for social insurance from the more
vulnerable social groups.
The point under discussion is whether
or not the compensation effect, which
would increase public spending, is bal-
anced and additionally, constrained by the
efficiency effect. Although this discussion
is still in a preliminary stage, most com-
mentators agree that a final assessment
of the efficiency and compensation ef-
fects of globalisation is an empirical mat-
ter[SchulzeandUrsprung, 1999, p. 301).
In the next section, I will turn to the theo-
retical discussion as well as to the more
relevant ernpirical results concerning
globalisation in both the suppiy and demand
side of the political market.
Govemments impose taxes on capital
so as to maximize social welfare.
4. GLOBALISATION AND TAX
COMPETITION
The basic contention of globalisation
and tax competition literature is that in a
globalised era, while many jurisdictions
compete for a given stock of capital, which
is assumed to be perfectly mobile across
jurisdictions, and pursuing the highest net
of tax return, labour is relatively irnmobile.
Consequently, a theoretical perspec-
tive asserts that if all jurisdictions have
equivalent technology and not consider-
ing scale economies, factors' gross-of-tax
returns depend only on their relative scar-
city [Schulze and Ursprung (1999): 309].
Moreover, in the case of capital taxation,
9 See Garret (1995), p. 670.
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if no taxes are levied or different jurisdic-
tions are subject to the same rate of taxa-
tion, capital wouldbe allocated effíciently
and governments would receive identical
gross rerura in each jurisdiction. It would
therefore be expected that governments
impose taxes on capital so that social wel-
fare is maximised. In other words, gov-
ernments would seek to créate the best
conditions for improving the profíts of a
representative agent10.
However, since there is tax competi-
tion, the main conclusión in the relevant lit-
erarure is that given capital mobility, public
goods will be underprovided and therefore
an ineffíciency condition will be generated,
which would only be resolved by a process
of worldwide tax harmonization". There
are at least two main factors that play
against tax harmonisation. The first is the
political reality of an international system,
composed by sovereign nation-states that
have usually opted for autonomous national
policies instead of internationally coordi-
nated taxation. The second factor concerns
the more favourable position of smaller
countries vis-á-vis bigger countries. In fact,
the former countries benefít from an ex-
temality: a higher foreign tax rates, and a
bigger the tax base of small countries, re-
duces the net return to capital [Schulze and
Ursprung (1999): 310]. On the contrary, a
reduction of the tax rate in large countries
would result in a higher world net return to
capital but not in the attraction of capital
from small countries12. In this sense, if
country size differences are too large, small
countries will resist tax harmonization.
If country size differences are too
largCj small countries mil resist tax
harmonization,
Therefore, it has been argued that in
a scenario of capital mobility and disequi-
libria of international tax policies -assum-
ing also that the residence principies would
not be enforceable13, and other tax instru-
ments are available -an effíciency per-
This utility, in turn, derives from two main factors. Firstly, from public goods provided by the state
and fínanced by tax revenues, and secondly from prívate goods, which are purchased out of net
income. The effíciency is reached when the marginal utility generatedby public goods consumption
equals marginal utility of prívate goods consumption. This equation is called the 'Sarnuelson condition1,
In fact, if it is assumed that governments behave rationally, marginal social benefit of taxation (MSBT)
isequal to its marginal social cost (MSCT). Eitherin a scenario ofimmobile capital orperfect capital
mobility, MSBT is always the same, that is, the benefít generated by the provisión of additional public
goods. However, MSCT varíes in a situation of mobile or immobile capital. Indeed, in the latter case,
MSCT equals the reduction in prívate (after-tax) income, however, in the former case, MSCT additionally
includes the loss of capital, which leaves the couníry as a consequence with a higher tax rate on capital.
In other words, MSCT in one country produces a positive externality for other countries because ií
increases their tax base and incomes. Tliese ineffíciency conditions might be eliminated by an international
coordination of capital taxrates, see Schulze and Ursprung (1999), p. 309.
The reason of this disequilibria lies in the fact that a large country is able to levy at a higher tax rate
because the consequent negative effect of the tax base (by capital exit) is smaller in per capita terms
and therefore, a higher tax rate translates into higher revenue per unit of capital, but a smaller tax base.
The underlying reasoning ¡s that taxes should noí necessaríly distort production effíciency, if taxes
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spective indicatesthatmobilecapitalshould 4.1, Empirical evidencefor
be altogether exempted from taxation and globalisation and taxpolicies
immobile domestic factors (land, labour)
should be taxed instead [Schulze and xhe general prediction derived from
Ursprung (1999): 310]14. In this sense, it literatee is that capital taxation will be
would be expected that capital tax rates negatively related to the degree of Ínter-
fall with the increase of capital mobility. national integration generally, and to inter-
However, taxes are set in a political pro- national capital mobility in particular16. This
cess, largely influenced by distributional means that the higher the degree of inter-
considerations, which makes it difficult to national integration and capital mobility, the
what extend this trend is due to capital iower the capital tax rates.
mobility orto ideologicalconsiderations15. m factj Rodrik (1997) examines the
influence of a country's openness on
labour and capital income tax rates sepa-
rately17. Rodrik's main fíndings are that
on activiíies and commodities can be set optimally, that is, taxes do not interfere with factor or
commodity trade. This, in turn, implies that capital income should be taxed according to the residence
principie, see Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) for a discussion,
14 An efficiency perspective disregards distributional effects, which are the main cause of concern of the
«doublejeopardy' hypothesis [Grunberg (199S) and Rodrik (1997)], and also that governments behave
efficiently, that is, providing the optimal level of public goods as implied by the Samuelson rule.
13 Furthermore, Richardson (2002) has outlined two theoretical reasons by which capital taxes can
increase in a scenario of capital mobility. Firstly, since in an open econorny the double taxation
problem is less important than in a closed economy, we wouid expect higher taxes on capital income.
In a closed economy capital income is íaxed as it accrues to corporations and as it is dispersed to a
company's owners, both of which are national agents. For this reason, no-distortionary taxation
usually includes low corporate taxes. In the case of an open economy, there are foreign investors,
which means íhat national governments are less concerned with a double taxation and mus capital tax
rates tend to be higher. See Richardson (2002), p. 14. Secondly, the location decisión of FDI around
the world is not only influenced by wages and capital tax rate, but also by a set menú of services,
which includes such factors as skilled labour, reliabie infrastructure and political security. In this
sense, Ríchardson (2002) concludes that international competition over footloose fírms might be
manifest not in tax cutting but in the provisión of the best set of productive services. It would be a
sort of market competition for FDI, in which different jurisdictions offer di verse menus of taxes and
services, among which corporations choose their location according to their preferences over those
menus, Huíbauer (1999) Cf. in Richardson (2002), p. 16.
16 In this sense, Schulze and Ursprung (1999), have proposed three hypotheses: a) «At a given point of
time, the countríes which tax capital least are the ones whose econormes are most integrated in the
world capital markeí. b) Capital taxation has been reduced overall over the last few decades as
countries have becorne increasingly integrated. c) Similar couníríes have similar tax rates whereas
smaller countries have lower rates than bigger ones». See Schulze and Ursprung (1999), p. 312
17 Opetvuess is defíned as the sum of exports and ímports divided by GDP, using data of IS OECD
countries, between the years 1965 and 1991 (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canadá, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
47
Ricardo Camargo Brito
the rate of openness is positively and sig-
nificantly correlated wíth labour tax rates;
and is negatively and signifícantly corre-
lated with capital tax rates. He concludes
that, «there is a strong evidence that as
economic integration advances, the tax
burden... is shifted from capital to labour»
[Rodrik (1997): 20]. However, these fínd-
ings are limited by the fací that the open-
ness variable refers to the goods trade
rather than to capital mobility, that most
literature links with tax competition18.
Notwithstanding, Rodrik (1997) uses an
additional dummy variable to capture the
restrictions on capital mobility as well as
to analyse the interaction of this dummy
with openness. Results show, in this case,
that the direct effect of openness is still
signifícantly positively correlated with
labour tax rates, but this effect is less
strong in the presence of capital account
restriction. However, the direct effect of
capital account restrictions on labour tax
rates is negative, but negligible. Further-
more, the direct effect of openness is still
negatively correlated with capital tax rates,
but no longer significant. In turn, the in-
teractive effect of openness and capital
account restrictions -both variable acting
together- on capital tax rates is signifí-
cantly positive and larger than the
abovementioned direct negative effect.
The direct effect of capital account re-
strictions on capital tax rates is, on the
contrary, negative. This dummy variable
is taken from the summary table in the
IMF's annual reports on exchange ar-
rangements and exchange restrictions
[Rodrik (1997): 18, note 5].
In short, Rodrik's empirical findíngs on
the relationship between trade liberali-
sation-capital mobility and the taxation
structure show, though not conclusively,
that an increased tax competition shifts the
tax burden away from mobile towards
iramobile factors such as labour.
The direct effect of the capital mobility
ratio does not show a significant
correlation with capital taxation.
Garret (1995), in tura, examines the
relationship between capital taxes as a
share of GDP and lagged endogenous
variables such as growth, unemployment,
the share of trade, and an Índex of capital
mobility19. He fmds that only an increas-
U.K. and U.S.). In íurn, as a tax rate measure is used the 'effective average tax rates' as calculated by
Mendoza et al (\ See, Rodrik (1997), pp. 19-20.
It has been argued that the trade share is referring to the actual flow of goods whereas capital mobility
refers to a potential to move the production factor capital rather than the actual magnitude of flows.
Moreover, the trade share is influenced by the country size independent of the degree of capital
mobility and thus openness is a crude and biased proxy for the degree of capital mobility. See,
Schulze and Ursprung (1999), p. 314.
This Índex is elaborated by classifying the number of types of international capital account transactions
and by assigníng a given rank from 1 to a máximum of 4. However, this índex does not measure the
actual strength of restrictions, but proxies only the coverage of restrictions, Garrett stresses that it is
roughly in accordance with the saving investment coefficient. However, other studies dispute that
this coefficient is a good indicator for the degree of capital mobility, see Jansen and Schulze (1996).
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ing exposure to trade is positively corre- associated with financial liberalisation in
latedwith capital taxation. In other words, the majority of regressions. In particular,
the direct effect of the Índex of capital corporate taxation reverme as a percent-
raobility does not show a significant cor- age of individual taxation is significantly
relation with capital taxation. On the other positively correlated with trade balance as
hand, it is worthwhile noting that the in- a percentage of GDP and financial
teraction of trade-share with an added in- liberalisation, which indicates a re-distribu-
dex that captures the influenceof the Left tive aspect of taxation. Quinn also fmds
as a political variable is positively corre- that corporate taxation revenue as a per-
lated with an increase in capital taxes, centageof GDP forboth OECD andnon-
showing an interesting relevance of politi- OECD countríes is positively and signifi-
cal factors in favour of the compensation cantly associated with financial
hypothesis. liberalisation [Quinn (1997): 539, Table 3].
Quinn (1997) studies the effects of Swank (1997) has studied the impact
variations in international financial regu- of domestic and international explanatory
lations20 upon corporate taxation21. The variables on corporate profít taxation and
results of his research show that most ernployer social security and payrolltaxa-
corporate taxation revenues are positively tion22. His main findings are that all of the
The data used is 15 OECD countries during the years 1967 and 1990 (Austria, Sweden, Finland,
Norway, Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Australia, Canadá,
Japan, United States and France). Additionally, Garrett considera an Índex for the partisan centre of
gravity in cabineí and the legislature, which is also analysed in íts interactíon with íhe índex of capital
mobility and the trade share, respectively. See Garrett (1995), p. 658.
20 The change in international financial regulations is a coding rule, which, following the categories of
The First Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions of the IMF, contemplates restrictions on both
currency transactions and the underlyíng international commercial transactions. Inward and outward
capital account transactions are measure by Capital, which is scored on a 0-4 scale. Inward and
outward current account transaction are coded Curren t. The sum of íhe six dimensions of Current and
Capital generales a 0-12 score, ranging from most closed (0) to mosí open (12) economy. Additionally,
there is a seventh dimensión which captures international legal agreements (Agree) that constrain a
nation's ability to restrict exchange and capital flows. See Quinn (1997), p. 535.
21 TJie dependent variables are the corporate tax revenue that isconsidered; (i) as a percentage of GDP
(ii) as a percentage of individual tax revenue and (iii) as a percentage of total government tax revenue.
The last two measures analyse redistribute aspects of tax collections. Data covers 38 countries
between the years 1974 and 1989: Latín American Nations: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Honduras, México, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela. East and Southeast Asia; Indonesia,
Korea, and Thailand. Members of OECD (1989): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canadá, Demark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Great Britain and USA. Other Emerging Market Nations: Ethiopia, Irán, Morocco, Sri
Lanka, Tunisia, andTurkey. See Quinn (1997), pp. 537, 545-546.
22 Domestic variables includes percentage changes on (i) ínvestment, (ii) real net operating income, (iii)
real GDP, (iv) the consumer price Índex, (v) an índex for the political power of the left, (vi) a dummy
for election years, (vii) total government outlays, and country dummíes. The ¡ntemational variable ís
capital mobility which is captured by three different measures: a) the actual total capital inflow and
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three measures that he uses to capture
capital mobility are systematically, signífi-
cantly, andpositively correlated with cor-
porate taxation, which is coincident with
results of Quinn's research23. However,
contrary to results reached by Quinn
(1997) and Garrett (1995), he fmds that
openness, captured by the share of trade
ín GDP, is negatively correlated with capi-
tal taxation.
4.2. An assessment of the empirical
evidencefor globalisation and
taxpolicies
To explain the sometimes 'intersecting'
results of the abovementioned studies, it is
worthwhile examining the various indica-
tors used to set up a specifíc definition of
globalisation as well as of taxpolicies.
Capital Mobility. Even though the
measure of globalisation used by Garret
(1995) and enhancedby Quinn (1997) and
Swank (1997) has been accepted as the
best way to capture the degree of capital
mobility in the contemporary scenario of
economic integration24, it still retains one
importan! conceptual shortcoming: this
measure disregards the importance of
transferpricingpossibilities. Indeed, ithas
been argued that even if capital flows were
excessively contrallad and restricted, and
arbitrage conditions did not exist, profíts
could still be shiftedbetween subsidiaries
[Schulze andUrsprung (1999): 313, note
26] and Quinn's indicators of capital mo-
bility would be unable to capture such
variations. This would become a more sig-
nificant weakness in the near future, con-
sidering that a central feature of the cur-
rent stage of capitalism seems to be a sig-
nificant development of the intra-trade fírm
[Castells (1996): 172].
The alleged correlation between
capital mobility and capital taxation
should be carefully analyzed.
Taxation Competition. Garret (1995),
Quinn (1997) and Swank (1997) use only
one measure to capture the degree of tax
competition: the capital income taxation
revenues25. This measure also presents a
fundamental conceptual problem: theposi-
outflow as a share of GDP, b) an índex of restríctions of capital account transactions (Score 0-4), c)
a broader índex of capital account as well as exchange restríctions (score 0-14). Both Índices were
taken from Quinn (1997). The data used is 17 industriaüsed countries duríng the years 1966 and
1993.
23 They are also, even though to in a lesser extent, positively correlated with employer social security
and payroll taxation.
24 Edwards (2000) compares Quinn's indicator with an Índex based on the number of years within a
certain period that, according to the IMF, a particular country has not ímposed capital controls. This
is called The Number-of-years-with-conírols: NUYCO is an índex used by Alesina, Grílli and
Milesi-Ferreti (1994) and by Rodrik (1998). Edwards fmds two main advantages of Quinn's indicator
over NUYCO: it allows for the capturing intermedíate situations of a country's capital account
openness and it is available for two different periods of time. See Edwards (2000), pp. 9-10.
25 Tax base multiplica by tax rate.
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tive correlation found between Corporate
Income Tax revenues and capital mobil-
ity could have as an alternative explana-
tion the increase of the tax base, as a con-
sequence-for instance-of the riseof op-
erating profíts as a share of GDP26, and
in fact, would not correspond at all to an
enhanced tax competition process27
[Schulze and Ursprung (1999): 316].
Therefore, thepositive correlation asserted
by Garret, Quinn and Swank that exists
between capital mobility and capital taxa-
tion should be carefully analysed.
Ideológica! postures asserting that
globalisation only affects tax
policies in one >vay should be observed
with caution.
Rodrik (1997), in turn, uses the effec-
tive average tax rate taken from Mendoza
etal (1994) as a measure of capital taxa-
tion, which seems to capture more prop-
erly the strategic variable, namely Corpo-
rate Incomes Tax rates and also has a
more effective control on the tax base
effect. In fací, the effective average tax
rate presents four advantages over other
measures of tax ratios: (i) it includes the
actual amount of tax collected in the nu-
merator, and thus implicitly takes into con-
sideration the combined effects of statu-
tory rates, tax deductions and tax credits;
(ii) it is much simpler to calcúlate than
marginal effective tax rates; (iii) it is a
macroeconomic indicator and therefore is
much easierto compare by country and is
also an appropriate input for large-scale
macroeconomic models, and (iv) it might
provide a guide to tax reforms as they of-
fer more insights than the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect taxes, or the
statutory íax rates [Volkerink and Haan
(2000): 11]. The calculation of Mendoza
et al (1994) has been criticised because it
gives rise to the misleading condition of
the use of the personal income ratio (the
ratios of personal income tax revenues
over the sum of wages and salaries, the
operating surplus of prívate unincorporated
enterprises and property, and entrepre-
neurial income) as an intermedíate step in
calculating labour and capital income tax
ratios. Indeed, incomes from labour, capi-
tal income and transfers are included in
the 'tax base' of personal incomes and it
is assumed that the same average tax
rates apply to all these income categorías.
The problem with this assumption is that
in many OECD countries some income
components are largely exempted from
taxation or have different statutory tax
rates. Trying to tackle this shortcoming,
Volkerink and Haan (2000), modifying the
methodology of Mendoza et al (1994) and
recalculating the tax ratio, fmd that nei-
ther the trend ñor the level of the labour
The 19SOs were very profítable years for corporations. Indeed, the operating profíts in 15 EU
member states as a percentage of GDP increased from 9.7 per cents to 13.0 per cents between the
years 1980 and 1996, cf. Kramer (199S).
This is because revenues are not governments' strategic variables; on the contrary, they are consequences
of the application of strategic variables such as the capital tax rate. Therefore, at best, they indirectly
reflect the tax competition process in which governrnent could be involved.
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income tax ratio or the capital income tax
ratio are well represented in at least some
of the countriesanalysedbyRodrik (1997)
[Volkerink and Haan (2000); 25 - 47].
Apart from Volkerink and Haan's cri-
tique of the effective average tax rate
measure used by Rodrik (1997) it is also
worthwhile highlighting as we did before
that Rodrik's fmdings are limited by the
use of a commodity trade variable rather
than capital mobility as a measure for
globalisation.
The basic premise of apolitical models
is that state intervention in economic
spheres is only intended to correct
marketfailures.
In sum, the empirical fíndings analysed
genérate a far from conclusive result,
mostly due to important theoretical and
methodological shortcomings. Because of
this, the debate on the fíeld must be ob-
served with caution, avoiding those ideo-
logical postures that unreflectively assert
that there exists only one irrefutable way
in which globalisation affects tax pólices.
That said, it is worth noting that even given
the limitations of the empirical research
analysed, the relevant literature seems to
point out to the following main conclusions
on the relationship between a given mea-
sure of globalisation and taxation:
a) It might reveal that during the
1980s and 1990s in some of the countries
subject to analysis capital tax revenue was
stable and capital tax rates showed a mod-
érate downward trend;
b) Apparently the hypothesis of the
race to the bottom has not taken place,
since globalisation has not led to a reduc-
tion of capital tax revenues.
c) However, effective tax rates on
labour have risen substantially and at least
the relative contribution of capital tax has
been reduced. This means that the impact
of globalisation on tax structure is in ac-
cordance with the effíciency effect, im-
plying that the cost of mobile factors, no-
tably labour, has increased with globa-
lisation [Schulze and Ursprung (1999):
321].
However, a real assessment of the
way in which the effíciency and compen-
sation effects of globalisation have been
manifest either in a competing or comple-
mentary way, also demands a review of
the expenditure side of fiscal policies also.
5. GLOBALISATION AND PUBLIC
SPENDING
Literature conceming globalisation and
public spending is focused on two main
theoretical aspects. The fírst refers to a
more general relationship between
globalisation and public spending, andis
illustrated by questioning to what extent
government spending is determined, and
how government size is modified, by
globalisation. The second point of concern
focuses on a more specific relationship,
and is pointed out by questioning how
globalisation affects the patteras of gov-
ernment spending. These aspects will be
analysed separately in the followings sec-
tionofthispaper.
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5.7. Government growth
and globalisation
The impact of globalisation on govern-
ment gro\vth has been studied on the ba~
sis of two theoretical approaches: apoliti-
cal and political-economic models.
5. L1. Apolítica! models
According to the basic premise of apo-
litical models, state intervention in economic
spheres is only intended to correct market
failures. In this sense, government growth
would only reñect a public view of the
needs of a given society, based on a stan-
dard consumer theory28. Since literatura on
the field has established that government
spending depends on, or it is influenced by,
input prices29, incomes30, preferences,
population size31, community inputs32, and
the increased cost of tax collection, it has
been argued that if globalisation affected
any of these factors, it would also indirectly
alter government spending [Schulze and
Ursprung (1999): 323].
Let us consider now some hypotheses
applied to the abovementioned factors in
order to discover whether or not it is pos-
sible to make a general prediction about
the impact of globalisation on government
spending according to this model.
First, it seems that globalisation, as
expected, would tend to restrict the in-
crease of input prices of public ser/ices
due to the reduction of wage rates pro-
duced by price equalisation and migration.
Also, competition for mobile factors
cansed as aconsequence of globalisation
might act as an incentive for the develop-
ment of more capital-intensive technolo-
gies in providing public services. In turn,
if we assume that globalisation originates
an increase in income volatility, it would
also stimulate an increased demand for
public welfareprogrammes. In conclusión,
all changes in the variable triggered by
globalisation would thus be reflected in a
positive impact on public spending33.
The standard consumer theory assumes that consumer utility is a funcíion of final service output.
The final service output depends on publícly provided inputs and community inputs.
Empirical studies confírm that input prices significantly influence public spending. The relationship
is as follows: since input prices have risen considerably and steadily since the 1930s, and because
public inputs represent mostly services (low capital-labour intensities) and techmcal progress has
augmented capital, and if demand is price inelastic, then government growth can be explained by the
increase of input prices. See Cf. Ferris and West (1996).
Several empirícal researches find a relationship between national income and a larger number of
government services. For a review of the most recent literature, see Richardson (2002).
The relationship between population size and public spending has not clearly been established.
However, some investigations -see Borcherding, T. (1985)- have concluded that the effect of population
size on public spending is not really signifícant. In any case the effect is not easy to measure.
Community inpuís are traditionally studied as substitutes for public inputs to final services outputs.
Community inputs depend on socio-economic variables, basically the female labour-market
participation rate and the household structure, and therefore any variation of these factors may have
an important influence of public spending. See Schwab and Zampelli (1987).
SeeKatsimi (1998) for a theoretical andempirical study of the relationship of income volatility and
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Therefore, if globalisation produced a de-
cline of community inputs, one could rea-
sonably assume an increase in public
spending as a necessary palliative of the
vacuum left within the community
[Schulze andUrsprung (1999): 325].
Ambiguities start when \ve examine
other factors, such as consumer prefer-
ences. Indeed, it is undisputed that chang-
ing preferences might affect the demand
for any goods, including public spending.
Therefore, although preferences are usu-
ally assumed to be invariable, if globa-
lisation brings about changes in a country's
preferences, these changes must be con-
sidered in the analysis of government
growth. Either they increase or decrease
it34, However, there is scant literature in
this área and the effects of these changes
are unknown.
Furthermore, the analysis of tax col-
lection costs points to the opposite trend.
Indeed, since predictably globalisation
would increase the costs of tax collection,
it would therefore result in a downward
pressure of public spending.
Consequently, due to the limited power
of predi ction of apolitical models, it would
be too risky to assume a definite trend in
the irnpact of globalisation on government
spending unless explicit political factors are
considered.
Acording to some authors the influence
ofnational pressure groups will be
reduced if globalisation produces
changes in political decision-making.
5,1.2. Political-economic models
These models interpret public spend-
ing as a result of policies of social redistri-
bution. The basíc assumption is that pub-
lic goods produced by governments are
equally distributed amongst voters and fí-
nanced by proportional income taxes35.
The mainprediction ofthis model is that if
we assume that in a globalised scenario
income inequalities were to rise36, ceterís
paribiis, we would expect an expansión-
ary effect on the government share of
GDP. However, using, the same models
other authors have argued that if
globalisation brings about a substantial
change in the state's political decisión-
social insurance government expenditure in the context of a closed econorny, and Rodrik (1998) for
the analysis of the same relationship for open econornies.
Changíng country's preferences could be due to migration or increased exposure ío other political
cultures. See Schulze and Ursprung (1999), p. 325.
The preferences of the electoraíe are decisive to determine the level of government spending. Within
the elecíorate the median voter decisión seem to be the most decisive. As the median voter decisión
varíes positively with the difference between mean and median incomes, government spending is
fínally determined by this income difference. However, the ernpirical results ofthis theory have not
ahvays been consistent. See, Meltzer and Richard (1981).
There is an open discussion about the relationship between globalisation and inequality. Among the
authors who argüe that globalisation reduces inequalities are Williamson (199S), Lindert and Williamson
(2001), Dowrick and DeLong (2001) and Wei and \Vu (2001). For a review of those authors, see
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making process, the influence of national
pressure groups will also be reduced and,
consequently, the demand for government
gro\vth will also diminish.
The balance, however, seems to in
favour the main prediction mentioned
above. Indeed, classical research in the
fíeld such as Peltzmans' (1980) reaffírms
the idea that government growth is related
to income differences. Although
Pelzmans' empirical fíndings, which sought
to establish a relevant influence of the
growing cohesión of the middle classes on
government growth in the US after the
Second World War, are not conclusive at
all, his hypothesis would allowus to con-
clude that if globalisation increased job
insecurity, it would contribute to a decline
of the political influence of the middle
classes and the consequent reduction of
government growth. Olson (1982), in tura,
argües that there is a cióse correlation
between longperíods of political stability
and the emergence of political pressure
groups, which would tend to positively in-
fluence public spending. Finally, the Le-
viathan theory assumes that since the
state monopolises power, public spending
might increase with greater centralisation
and decrease with greater fragmentation.
Then, if globalisation, as many argüe, pro-
duces a loss of state monopoly power and
the fragmentation of its authority, it would
give rise to a consequential decrease on
public spending [Brennan and Buchanan
(1980); Nelson (1987); Zax (1989) and
Gates (1989)].
It is a basic premise that globalisation
can genérate a more transparent
taxsystem.
Finally, it has been argued that gov-
ernment growth is facilitated by fiscal il-
lusion37. However, if we accept that
globalisation may affect not only the tax
base but also tax structures, fiscal ¡Ilu-
sión may have been similarly affected.
Indeed, it is a basic premise that
globalisation can genérate a more trans-
parent national tax system but, at the
same time, a less progressive income-tax
schedule. If this were to be the case, fis-
cal illusion would be reduced, and gov-
ernment growth subjected to a down-
ward pressure.
5.1.3. Empirical evidence
for globalisation and public spending
Let us consider some of the empiri-
cal evidence of the effects of
globalisation on public spending. Garrett
(1995) and (1998), Cusack(1997)íSwank
(1997),Quinn(1997),andRodrik(1997);
(1998) study the impact of a given mea-
sure of globalisation on public spending,
mostly in OECD countries. However,
Richardson (2002), pp. 22 to 26. In tura, Quinn (1997), Rodrik (1998), and Wade (2004) fínd a
positive relation between globalisation and inequality.
Fiscal illusion refers ío a sort of a special status that the tax price of public ¡nput would have, by
which voters would tend to underestimate it. This special status, in turn, would allow governments
to increase taxes of public input without any significant political cost. See Oates (19SS).
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some of these authors follow specifíc
lines of research.
A study by Cusack shows a
significan! negativa correlation
between capital marketintegration
and government growth.
Garrett (1995), Cusack (1997) and
Swank (1997) adopt a political economic
model. Specifically, Garret (1995) and
Cusack (1997) analyse to what extent the
margin for government discretion has
been reduced by globalisation and the role
of political party orientation in the deter-
mination of redistributionpolicies. Swank
(1997), in turn, focuses on the role of
democratic institutions as mediating ac-
tors between globalisation and national
policy responses. By contrast, Quinn
(1997), Rodrik (1997) and (1998), and
Garrett (1998) assume an apolítica! per-
spective.
a) Empirical research based on
the political-economic model.
Garrett (1995) uses a percentage of
GDP as a dependent variable government
spending and, economic growth, unemploy-
ment, trade shares and an Índex of capital
mobility as independent variables38. He
fmds a negative correlation between capi-
tal-market and trade integration on one
hand, and the level of public spending on
the other. Additionally, he establishes that
there is no signifícant positive correlation
between the índex «Left labour power»
and public spending, considering those
variables alone. However, the interaction
between a high level of capital market and
trade integration with high scores of the
índex of «Left labour power» appears to
be positively correlated with public spend-
ing. On the contrary, at a low level of capi-
tal market and trade integration with simi-
lar scores of the índex of «Left labour
power», government spending varíes
negatively [Schulze andUrsprung (1999):
334], Cusack (1997) measures the impact
of capital market integration on public
spending on the basis of data for OECD
countries for the years 1955-198939. The
main results of his study show a signifí-
cant negative correlation between capi-
tal-market integration and government
growth. In turn, the political stance of the
cabinet is negatively correlated with gov-
ernment spending when the political ten-
dency of the cabinet is to the Right, and
positively associated in the case of the
See note 19. He also includes as independent variable an Índex that captures the centre of gravity of
government and legislatura on a íeft-right scale. Additionally, he considers an Índex of left-labour
power andan Índex measuring the concentration of trade unionism. See Garrett( 1995), p. 659.
Cúsale uses the Feldsíein/Horioka measure, \vhich assesses the absolute valué of the normalised
difference between prívate saving and investment. He also uses the notion of change in non-defence
government outlays as a percentage of GDP. Additionally, as well as Garrett (1995), Cusack includes
an Índex to capture the centre of gravity of government and legislature on a left-right scale. He uses
two explanatory variables: the centre of gravity of the legislature and the distance beíween the centres
of gravity of government and legislature, see Schulze and Ursprung (1999), p. 330-333.
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Left. He also discovered that the differ-
ence between the political stance of the
cabinet and legislature is positively corre-
lated with government spending.
Swank (1997) measures the impact of
financial market integration on government
spending and the interaction of those vari-
ables with the role of democratic institu-
tions40. He fmds that while capital market
integration (with the exception of Foreign
Direct Investment) does not signifícantly
influence government growth, trade inte-
gration does have a positive influence on
government growth. He also discovers that
capital market integration shows a signifí-
cant positive influence on that growth in
countries characterised by high corpora-
tism41, high consensus democracy42, and
low dispersión of authority43. On the con-
trary, it has a significant negative influence
on government growth in countries
characterised by low corporatism, low
consensus democracy and a high disper-
sión of authority44.
b) Empírica! research based on the
apolítica! inodel
Quinn (1997) examines the impact of
capital mobility on government expendi-
ture on the basis of data from 38 coun-
tries45. His main fínding is that capital
mobility is positively correlated with gov-
ernment spending.
Rodrik (1998), in turn, studies the im-
pact of openness46 upon government
spending47 frorn data collected from over
one hundred countries48. He also includes
terms of trade volatility as an explanatory
variable. His main conclusions are that
trade integration is positively associated
with government spending and that the
interaction between terms of trade vola-
tility and openness show a highly signifí-
To capture the degree of capital market integration he uses a measure of total inflow and outflow of
capital, foreign direct investment and total borrowing on International capital markets as a percentage
of GDP. He also utilises an Índex based on the IMF classification of restriction on cross-border
movemenís and the absoluto valué of covered interest pariíies to capture the degree of capital market
liberalisation. Additíonally, he includes the standard measure of trade integration, that is, exports plus
imports divided by GDP. It also includes the total public sector outlays as a percentage of GDP.
For example, Norway and Sweden.
For example, Belgíum and Netherlands.
For example, Denmark and Finland.
Swank (1997) reaffírrns his results in a second more specifíc regression, which employs public
consumption instead of total public sector outlays.
For the rneasure of capital mobility and the individualization of the 38 countries see Note 21, p. 12.
Quinn (1997) uses a measure of government outlays net of defence and education expenditures as a
percentage of GDP and an addítional measure of government welfare and social security payments,
see Quinn (1997), p. 537.
He uses the exports plus imports divided by GDP to measure trade integration: openness. Data is
taken from world tables 5.6. See Rodrik (1998), p. 999.
He uses government spending as a share of GDP. The data is taken from the World Bank's World
Data 1995. See Rodrik (1998), p. 999.
Rodrik (1998) considers data from developed and developing countries, including OECD, Latín
American, East Asia, (ex) Socialist and Sub-Saharan África countries. See Rodrik (1998), p. 1003.
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cant positive impact on government con-
sumption as a share of GDP.
Most poorer countries face high
trade risks and therefore their public
spending varíes positively with
openness.
In his 1997a book Rodrik uses a nar-
rower datábase than ¡n his 1998 study. In
fací, in the former he only includes OECD
countries in order to analyse the impact
of openness and terms of trade volatility
on social security and welfare expendi-
ture. His main fmdings are that openness
and terms of trade volatility have a nega-
tive effect on social security and welfare
expenditures; the interaction of openness
and terms of trade volatility indícate that
countries with high levéis of openness and
trade volatility present larger amount of
welfare spending than countries with low
levéis of openness and trade volatility, and
that openness has a particularly negative
strong effect on welfare spending when
there is a high level of capital mobility.
These somewhat mixed results, compared
to the Rodrik's (1998) findings, have been
expíained by the size and composition of
the data utilised in both studies. Indeed,
the positive correlation between openness
and public spending foundbyRodrik(1998)
could simply be due to the fact that this
research considers a broader sample of
countries, including relatively poor coun-
tries. Most of these face high terms of
trade risk and therefore their public spend-
ing varíes positively with openness. On the
contrary, OECD countries, which are in-
cluded in Rodrik's earlier study (1997a),
as a general rule present lower levéis of
terms of trade risk and thus their public
spending is negatively correlated with
openness.
Finally, Garrett (1998) seeks to mea-
sure the influence of trade integration49
and capital mobility50 on government con-
sumption51. Additionally, he includes an Ein-
teraction terms' variable52 to capture the
influence of globalisation on the conver-
gence of policy regimes among nations.
The main results of Garrett' s study (1998)
are that trade integration is positively as-
sociated with government spending but
there is not any significant influence of fí-
nancial and real capital mobility on gov-
ernment consumption. Moreover, with the
'interaction terms' variable trade integra-
tion generates a tendency of divergence
in policy regimes of the countries
analysed.
49 He uses the traditional measures of trade integration: exports plus imports divided by GDP.
50 He uses the same índex as Garrett (1995). See note 19 in p. 12. Additionally, he uses a measure to
capture the FDT flows, that is, FDÍ divided by GDP.
51 Garrett (1998) considers changes ín government consumption as a percentage of GDP.
52 This variable considers the interaction between térras of írade volatility and openness and capital
mobiliíy.
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5.1.4. An assessment ofthe empirical
evidencefor globalisation andpublic
spending
a) Empirical research based on the
political-economicmodel.
As a general rule, the fmdings of the
three works analysed conclude that the size
of govermnent is not necessaríly reduced
in a globalised era and that ideological fac-
tors as well as social structure differentia-
tions play a key role in determining íhe level
of government expenditure.
Indeed, Garrett's fmdings (1998) sup-
port the hypothesis that governments that
are ruled by strong Left parties tend to
increase their public spending with a high
level of globalisation. Cusack (1997), in
turn, concludes that the rise of globalisation
has not eliminated the influence of poli-
tics. In fací, the Left seeras inclined to
increase the size ofthe public sector and
the Right to reduce it [Cusack (1997):
392]53. Finally, Swank (1997) concludes
that political institutions and social struc-
tures play an important role in mediating
the impact that globalisation might exert
on the government growth.
b) Empirical research based on the
apolitical model
The three cross-section studies that
we have examined show that there is an
important correlation between globalisation
and government spending. Indeed, all three
fmd that the demand for social insurance
programmes grows with the increase of
international economic integration. How~
ever, as they all use different methodolo-
gies to capture the degree of international
economic integration, their results, which
in many senses are contradictor/, must be
treated with caution54.
Empirical evidence points to a positiva
correlation between globalisation and
government growth.
To summarise, the empirical evidence
analysed on both models seems to lend
substantial support to the 'compensation
hypothesis', since not only would globali-
sation be positively correlated with gov-
ernment growth, but also suggests, as pre-
dicted, that governments are not very vig-
orously cutting backthe provisión of goods
and services to those on whom they rely
for political support.
However, one of the main method-
ological objections of this conclusión is that
Cusack (1997) points out that although the integration of states into the international capital market
has, in fact, had a depressing effect on the size of public spending, there is no evidence to conclude
that these trends have ovenvhelmed the relevance of domestic partisan political influences in the
determination of public expenditure. See Cusack (1997), p. 392.
This is particularly notorious between the works of Quinn (1997) and Garrett (1998). In fact, while
the former fínds a positive association between capital mobility and government, the latter shows the
¡nverse tendency.
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none of these works have adequately
taken into account that government spend-
ing is a 'mixed bag' rather than a single
variable, composed of diverse Ítems, most
of which react in different ways to the
constraints imposed by globalisation.
Therefore, it is relevant to study separately
the impact of globalisation on the struc-
ture of public spending.
International competition for
productive factors generates positive
externalities for immobile factors.
5.2. Globalisation and the structure of
public spending
It has been argued that the analysis
of the influence of globalisation on the dif-
ferent components of public spending is
the key factor to assess the 'compensa-
tion hypothesis' [Schulze and Ursprung
(1999): 337]. Particularly, if we assume
that the increase of some types of gov-
ernment expendiíure, such as public infra-
structure spending, it would support the
efñciency hypothesis rather than the com-
pensation hypothesis [Aschauer(1988)].
Additionally, the analysis of the struc-
ture of public spending is methodologically
relevantbecausethe influence of openness
on government growth could be a conse-
quence of country size effects instead of
trade integration. Since government con-
sumption as a percentage of GDP is nega-
tively correlated with population size (given
economies of scale and a fixed cost of gov-
ernment service) and openness also varíes
negatively with population size, government
consumption could vary positively with
openness, even if there is not a direct causal
link between both variables [Schulze and
Ursprung (1999), p. 337].
Therefore, the real variables to be
analysed should be social insurance com-
ponents of government spending in par-
ticular, instead of government spending in
general.
5.2.7. Theoretical links between
globalisation and the structure
of public spending
International competition forproduc-
tive factors, particularly capital competi-
tion, brought about by globalisation, tends
to genérate positive externalities for im-
mobile factors. Inthis sense, in aglobalised
scenario we expect to fínd increased gov-
ernment spending in favour of these fac-
tors, especially in terms of public goods
provisión which improves theirproductiv-
ity55. In turn, the increasing economic in-
stability and uncertainty often associated
with globalisation tends to produce an in-
creased demand for redistribution of
programmes. Therefore, globaíisation
would also be positively associated with
redistributive spending programmes
[Schulze and Ursprung (1999): 338].
Examples of these public goods provisions are: public infrastructure, training labour programmes and
improving environment and cultural conditions. See Keen and Marchand (1997).
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5.2.2. Empirical research on
globalisation and the structure of
public spending56
Most empirical studies that have tested
the theoretical links existing between
globalisation and the structure of public
spending have used either the economic
classifícation or the functional classifica-
tion of government expenditures57, and
have been classified within either political
economic models orapolitical models.
a) Empirical research based on the
política l-economic model
Hicks and Swank (1992) have stud-
ied the influence of political orientation of
the competing parties on welfare state
expenditure58 and have included open-
ness59 as an explanatory variable of wel-
fare state expenditures. They fínd that
there is a positive and signifícant córrela-
tion between openness and social secu-
rity benefíts spending as well as a direct
proportional influence of Centre orRight
opposition parties upon the decrease of
welfare expenditures of a Left govern-
ment. They also discover a direct propor-
tional influence of Left opposition parties
on the increase of welfare expenditures
of Right and Centre governments.
Huber, Ragin and Stephens (1993)
also assess the influence of partisan po-
litical orientation and openness60 on wel-
fare state expenditures61. They find that
there is no positive and signifícant corre-
lation between openness and social secu-
rity benefíts spending, but that such cor-
relation exists between openness and so-
cial security transfers. Additionally, they
find that both Social and Christian demo-
cratic parties have a positive influence on
welfare state spending, with Social demo-
cratic parties having a stronger impact than
Christian democratic parties.
Openness and social security benefíts
are positively correlated.
However, it is worth noting that empirical quantifí catión of the theoretical premises of the relationship
between globalisation and the structure of public spending is particularly complicated to assert
because it is difficult to distinguish public expenditures motivated by effíciency considerations from
those motivaíed by involuntary redistribution. See Schulze and Ursprung (1999), p. 338.
The economic classifícatión distinguíshes five different categorías of government expendiuire: (í)
government consumption (purchases goods and services, (ii) current transfer (redistribution
programmes), (iii) capital formation (public investment), (iv) interest payments on government debí
and (v) capital íransfer. The functional classifícation, in turn, comprises of four policy áreas: (i) the
traditional dornain (general public services, public order, safety and defence) (ii) the welfare state
(education, heath, social security welfare and housing) (iii) the mixed economy (economic services)
and (iv) other functions.
They capture the welfare state expenditure by using an indicator of social security benefíts taken
from ILO (International Labour Organization).
Exports plus imports divided by GD.R
Exports plus imports divided by GDP.
In this case, the dependent variable of welfare state expenditures is the measure of social security
transfer payments used by the OECD.
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Swank (1997) measures the influence
of capital market iníegration62 on the share
of outlays for social transfers as a per-
centage of GDP. He finds that capital
market integration does not present a sig-
nifícant negative influence on social trans-
fers. However, fínancial integration63 pre-
sents a positive influence on the volume
of social transfers and capital market in-
tegration has a signifícant positive influ-
ence on social transfers in countries
characterised by high corporatism, high
consensus democracy and a low disper-
sión of authority.
b) Empírica! research based on the
apolitical model.
Quinn (1997) analyses the impact of
capital mobility on government welfare
and social security payments. He con-
cludes that capital mobility generates an
increase in welfare and social security
payments.
Garrett and Mitchell (1997) investí-
gate the impact of globalisation64 on vari-
ous types of income transfer programmes
in OECD countries. They fmd that total
trade does not have a signifícant positive
influence upon any category of public
transfers. In turn, trade exposure multi-
plica with terms of trade volatility only,
produces a signifícant positive influence
on unemployment benefits expenditures.
In the case of the volume of imports com-
ing from low wage countries, they fmd a
signifícant positive influence on total in-
come transfers, old-age pensions and un-
employment benefit expenditures. Finally,
Garrett and Mitchell (1997) show that fí-
nancial market integration presents a sig-
nifícant positive effect upon total income
transfers, family allowance and 'other
transfers'65.
Partisan characteristics would still be
important in determining the patterns
of public spending.
Rodrik (1998) has studied the impact
of openness on different types of govern-
ment spending and finds that openness has
a signifícant positive influence on most of
them. However, this positive correlation
is truly signifícant in the 1990-1992 regres-
sion, but not in the 1985-1989 one. Addi-
tionally, the only Ítem of government
spending in which openness does not ex-
ert a signifícant positive influence is on
interest payments on public debí.
In an earlier study Rodrik (1997a)
analyses the influence of openness and
terms of trade volatility, social security and
welfare expenditures for OECD coun-
tries. In that work he fínds that openness
He captures the degree of capital market integration by the following measures: total capital flows,
FDI, borrowing and capital liberalizaron.
Thís variable is captured by measuring the inverse of covered interest rate differentials.
Globalisation is captured by three measures: (i) The volume and volatility of trade (ii) the volume of
imports coming from low wage countries and (iii) financia! market integration, which is measured by
covered interest rate differentials.
«Other transfers» include benefits for sickness and disabilities.
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and terms of trade volatility separately
exert a negative effect on social security
and welfare expenditures. He also finds
that the interaction of openness and terms
of trade volatility indícate that countries
with a higher degree of openness and ex-
posure to substantial external risk produce
higher welfare expenditures than tliose
countries that are open but less exposed.
5.2.3. An assessment ofempirical
evidencefor globcdisation and
the. structtire of public spending
Although some results are contradic-
tory66, overall the aforementioned litera-
tee tends to show a signifícant positive
influence of openness [Hicks and Swank
(1992), Huber et al (1993), Garrett and
Mitchell (1997) and Rodrik (1997a);
(1998)], financial integration [Swank
(1997) and Garret and Mitchell (1997)]
and capital mobility [Quinn (1997)] upon
different components of welfare state
spending.
Additionally, the results ofempirical
research based on a political-economic
model show that partisan characteristics
are still important in determining the pat-
tems ofpublic spending [Hicks and Swank
(1992)]. In fací, the design of the demo-
cratic institutions that regúlate the inter-
action between governments and eco-
nomic interest is central to defming the
specifíc way in which globalisation affects
the structure ofpublic spending [Huber et
al, (1993)]. Furthermore, in countries with
social corporatism, consensus democracy
and centralisation, the compensation ef-
fect of globalisation is relatively stronger
than that of the efficiency effect of
globalisation [Swank, (1997)].
In ten, the fmdings ofempirical re-
search based on apolitical models estab-
lish a positive relationship between
globalisation and welfare state spending.
However, this correlation is more explicit
and constant between capital mobility
[Quinn, (1997)] or financial market inte-
gration [Garrett and Mitchell, (1997)] and
different Ítems of welfare state spending
than in the correlation of openness and
welfare state spending, in which results
are not totally consistent. Indeed, while
Garrett and Mitchell (1997) do not fmd any
signifícant positive association between
openness and welfare state spending, in
his two studies Rodrik apparently fmds
contradictory results. In fací, in the more
recent one he reports a signifícant posi-
tive influence that contrasts with the ear-
lier one, where he finds an inverse result.
However, the apparent contradiction is
explained when the variable of'openness'
is combined with terms of trade volatility.
In this case, Rodrik (1997a) shows that
the interaction of openness and terms of
trade is positively correlated with welfare
state expenditures. Finally, Rodrik's 1998
and 1997a studies agree with the state-
ment that in countries with a simultaneous
high level of openness and high exposure
to substantial external risk, welfare state
spending varíes positively with openness.
66 "Notably, the ¡nverse relation between total trade and any category of public transfers shown by
Hicks and Swank (1992) on the one hand, and Huber, Ragin and Stephens (1993) on the other hand.
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This result is coincident with the final con-
clusión reached by Garrett and Mitchell
(1997) who fmd a positive significant in-
fluence of both openness and terms of
trade acting together on unemployment
benefit expenditures.
In a global economy states have neither
beconieunnaturalbusiness units ñor
have the expanded their policy choices.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Paraphrasing the question raised by
Dani Rodrik: has globalisation gone too
far? we must conclude that the answer,
at least in the field of fiscal policies in
OECD countries, to which the examined
studies are mostly restricted, is far from
uniform and conclusive. One thing that
however seems to be clear ¡s that states
have neither become unnatural, even im-
possible business units in a global economy,
as suggested by Ohmae (1995): 5, ñor
have they necessarily experienced an ex-
pansión of their policy choices, as implied
by Weiss (1998): 184. States are clearly
not disappearing from the International
arena but they do seem to be affected by
'new' constramts that diminish their ca-
pacity to autonomously setup both tax and
government expendíture policies.
Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that
the 'autonomous character' of fiscal poli-
cies is here understood as the capacity that
governments once had in formulating their
policies, to only accept pressures coming
from traditional domestic factors; a reduc-
tion of such autonomy being a situation in
which governments seemto be compelled
to accept a greater influence of global fac-
tors such as openness, capital mobility or
high trade volatility. If this is the case, in
the context of globalisation a reduction of
the autonomy of fiscal policies of states
has clearly takenplace.
Atotally different conclusión emerges,
however, if we assume that these con-
straints, that are affecting the autonomy
of governments to setup their fiscal poli-
cies are exclusively due to globalisation
understood as an increasing process of
openness and capital mobility, which acts
as a natural causal phenomenon. In other
words, if there is really a myth about
globalisation, it is that which affirms that
£Politics5 is no longer relevant for the con-
figuration of the new form of the global
economy. The (ideological) iliegitimate
underlying assumption in the debate of the
impact of globalisation upon fiscal policies
is that globalisation is a type of natural
phenomenon, that leaves players with no
other option but to accept it as inevitable.
Indeed, apart from the role that states
might have played in the origin of
globalisation, as has been highlighted by
Gilpin (1987), some of the most outstand-
ing studies on fiscal policies in a globalised
era are those which show that constraints
imposed by globalisation are not only far
from being conclusive but also that the real
impact of these constraints depends on the
type of society, government and level of
development that each country presents
[Garrett (1998); Cusack (1997); Swank
(1997); Hicks and Swank (1992); Huber
etal, (1993)].
64
The Globalisation Debate Revisited
The most accurate conclusión about
the impact of globalisation on fiscal poli-
cies of the states, though also the most
challenging one, would thus be that there
is no conclusión at all if we understand
globalisation as a final paradigm that gov-
ernments unavoidably have to adopt.
Therefore, far from being an inevitably
constraining phenomenon regulated ac-
cording to 'economic invariable laws',
globalisation turns out to be, betterunder-
stood if it is observed as an economic po-
litical process (historically determined), as
classic political economy has ahvays in-
sistently emphasized.
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